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“It’s a fine line between … self-discipline, devotion and dedication”: negotiating authority in the 
teaching and learning of Ashtanga yoga  
  
Abstract: 
 
This paper looks at the production and shaping of the self via Ashtanga yoga, a bodily practice, 
growing in significance in Western cultures, which can involve a radical form of (re)shaping the self.  
In particular, it looks at the interaction of external and internal sources of authority, including the 
yoga student’s own expertise of themselves (experiential authority), the authority of the practice and 
the authority of the teacher. This allows the paper to rethink standard models of authority in 
educational and ‘spiritualities of life’ literatures, which have generally imagined a top-down singular 
form of authority, essentially stamped onto the subjects being educated. The paper outlines what 
might enter into a more ‘distributed’ form of authority; being not simply the educator figure (their 
positionality, status, institutional location, contextualisation within prior fields of knowledge/belief), 
but also how their exertion of authority meshes (and sometimes conflicts with) the ‘experiential 
authority’ of the subjects being educated, articulating with their own ‘self-authority’  (what they 
know, expect and command from themselves , on the basis of countless prior experiences, encounters, 
interactions, times and spaces). The paper draws upon qualitative fieldwork carried out in Brighton, 
UK. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is difficult to conceive of teaching and learning in the absence of relations of authority, and standard 
visualisations of education – notably in school, college or university situations – revolve around the 
exertion of the educator’s authority over the educated (the teacher over the taught). As a contribution 
to this special issue on alternative geographies of education, the following paper explores a different 
framing of how educators (broadly conceived) may acquire, wield and make effective the authority 
that is seemingly central to how they teach. As such, it should be regarded as an exercise in thinking 
geographies of authority, potentially of relevance to both the emerging geographies of education 
subfield and wider inquiries into geographies of power, introducing authority itself as warranting 
attention for how it is created, enacted and, if necessary, enforced across a range of worldly spaces 
(bodies, rooms, halls, corners, corridors, cafés). The specific aim will be to avoid standard models of 
top-down singular authority, essentially as ‘stamped’ on to subjects being taught, and instead to 
envision what might be called a more ‘distributed authority’. Authority in this guise becomes more 
relational and multiple, not simply about the figure of the educator – his/her positionality, status, 
institutional location, framing within prior fields of knowledge/belief and embodied occupation of 
space (for instance, at the front of a classroom, on a raised platform) – but also how the educator’s 
exertion of authority meshes with the ‘experiential authority’i of subjects being educated. The paper 
thereby takes seriously the formation of subjects’ own ‘self-authority’ii, asking about what they come 
to know, expect and command from themselves on the basis of numerous prior experiences, 
encounters, interactions, times and spaces.  
 
The existing body of literature considering authority and education, to be introduced shortly, has 
largely focussed on school settings. This paper, however, looks at an alternative and perhaps less 
obvious manifestation of education: namely, yoga as a form of education, wherein experts seek to 
instruct their pupils not only in the postures of yoga, but also in the underlying philosophies, and 
wider ‘ways of living’ embodied by yoga. Our focus is specifically Ashtanga yoga, a form of ‘modern 
postural yoga’ (MPY)iii that hinges on physical, embodied practices, a relatively recent aspect of the 
practice of yoga iv. The relationship between yoga and authority has been addressed within the 
literature on ‘spiritualties of life’ v vi , but, as we will argue, this literature is also rooted in an 
oversimplified idea of authority. Rather, our emphasis will lie in exploring different ways of 
conceiving authority in education, empirically focusing on the operation, negotiation and contestation 
of ‘distributed authority’ between the educators (here Ashtanga teachers) and the educated (Ashtanga 
students) in Mysore-style Ashtanga classes.  
 
In the paper we proceed by considering how authority has been conceptualised in educational 
literatures (section 2), literatures about spiritualties of life (section 3) and in relation to the formation 
of the self (section 4). A presence in some of this literature is what we term ‘middle’ period Foucault 
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and his analytics of disciplinary power. Following a brief introduction to our empirical research 
(section 5), we examine authority in Ashtanga yoga, offering interpretations of how the Ashtanga 
teacher exerts authority (section 6a), how the Ashtanga student develops his or her own authority 
of/over themselves (section 6b) and how these two (often contradictory) sources of authority are 
negotiated within the space of the Ashtanga yoga class (section 6c). Concluding comments follow, 
linking to ideas of the ‘very late’ Foucault from his final two lecture courses on ‘the government of self 
and others’,vii as we stage final remarks about alternative geographies of authority, education and 
teachers. 
 
2. Authority in education 
 
The education literature has covered the issue of authority, usually in school settings,viii and yet it still 
remains ‘a fundamental, problematic and poorly understood component of classroom life’ix. Loosely 
echoing Weber’s distinctions between ‘traditional’ and ‘legal’ forms of authority, the former 
sanctioned by ‘time and tradition’ and the latter bureaucratically installedx, two basic understandings 
arise of how teachers develop or maintain their position of authority. First, they are seen to be in 
authority, a form of (de facto) authority wherein they can work practically on pupils’ conduct as a form 
of social control; and, secondly, they are seen to be an authority, a theoretical (de jure) authority 
wherein they are regarded as superior in the areas of knowledge and beliefxi. Analytic schemas duly 
reflect the relative subject positions of teachers in authority and pupils without authority, tending to 
underline, albeit not necessarily with a critical voice, the fundamentally unequal power relations 
running between teacher and taughtxii. More nuanced observations characterise a teacher’s authority 
as encompassing: competent authority (their skills and knowledge); legitimate authority (their position in 
a social hierarchy); coercive authority (the belief that a teacher will carry out a threat of force if students 
fail to comply); authority by inducement (the teacher offers rewards)xiii; and personal authority (the 
qualities of the teacher [e.g. charisma] and the pupil’s desire to please the teacher) xiv . Such 
observations do begin to flesh out the workings of authority, hinting at the importance of context and 
also the role of students, but the drift is still to cast authority as inhering in the person of the teacher 
rather than being a relational achievementxv, meaning that the experiences of those who are subject, or 
make themselves subject, to authoritative power relations in an educational setting are neglectedxvi. 
 
The subfield of geographical research on education has not said much about questions of authority, at 
least not along the lines pursued in this paper. The earliest contributions concentrated on the spatial 
contours of overall educational/school systems, with particular interest in catchmenting, the 
demographics of school rolls and the effects of areal deprivation on school performance indicators
xviii
xvii. 
More recently, with an effective rebirth of the subfield – cast as ‘new geographies of education and 
learning’  – a range of new issues have surfaced, entraining subject-matters such as the spatial 
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restructuring of education under neoliberalism, the transnationalism of students, the place of 
education in students’ career development, and the connections between education, socio-cultural 
difference and agendas of cosmopolitanism, citizenship and social inclusionxix. The view has been 
largely from the school gates looking outwards, rather than looking closely into the dynamics of how 
schools, classrooms and institutional-educational spaces actually ‘work’ in practice. This is not entirely 
the case, and some studies have addressed ‘subjectivities in diverse learning spaces’xx, tackling the 
ethico-politics of curricula, the spatial-identity politics of students or the emotional-affective 
atmospherics of inhabiting a range of educational spaces both in schools and beyond.xxi Collins and 
Coleman hence characterise ‘social geographies of education’ which either look ‘beyond’ or ‘within 
school boundaries’, noting a few studies confronting the ‘social control function’ of schools and, in so 
doing, tracking how ‘school spaces, and the classroom in particular, are organised in ways intended to 
facilitate adult authority and surveillance’.xxii  
 
Collins and Coleman suggest a Foucauldian inflection in such studies, citing in particular Foucault’s 
mid-1970s text Discipline and Punish, and they effectively underscore how Foucault’s attention to ‘the 
art of distributions’ – or ‘the distribution of individuals in space’ – should be fundamental to any 
sustained account of ‘authority and surveillance’.xxiii
xxvii
xxviii
 While Foucault’s oeuvre has remained as yet but 
lightly quarried by geographers of education – and, indeed, by scholars identifying with the 
neighbouring sub-field of ‘children’s geographies’xxiv – there can be little doubt that what Foucault 
identifies as ‘the meticulousness of the regulations, the fussiness of the inspections, the supervision of 
the smallest fragments of life and the body’ (integral to the innovations of an emerging modern 
European disciplinary regime) do indeed pervade ‘the context of the school’xxv. The geographer most 
explicitly joining these dots is Gallagher xxvi, who acknowledges that ‘Foucault’s work on power 
resonates with [his] experiences of research in educational institutions’  and provides detailed 
descriptions of the micro-spaces of power constitutive of primary schools. While Gallagher stresses 
spatialised forms of teacher surveillance, visual and aural, his Foucault-inspired picturing of power 
also takes seriously the reversals of power, the potential for power to enable resistance as well as 
domination, which thereby ‘complicates the view of adults as powerful and children as 
powerless’.   As such, Gallagher arrives at a sense of ‘distributed power’ not wholly different from 
our ideas about ‘distributed authority’, although his approach arguably sidesteps questions about 
authority – how it arises, is maintained and rendered efficacious, in conventional or alternative forms 
– as well as also drawing inspiration from the ‘middle’ rather than the ‘later’ Foucaultxxix. Gallagher 
remains a crucial background for us in what follows, however, even as we make a gradual switch 
through our paper to engaging more directly with the ‘later’ and then ‘very late’ Foucault. 
  
3. Authority and spiritualities of life 
 
From the perspective of the sociology of religion, yoga has been understood as an alternative spiritual 
 6 
practice
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxvi
xxxvii
xxx. Heelas has coined the term ‘spiritualities of life’ to conceptualise such practices, arguing 
that a distinction can be made between ‘life-as religion’ and ‘spiritualties of life’ on the basis of where 
the authority to decide how best to live is locatedxxxi. In the former, authority is held and transmitted 
to subjects by the earth-bound interpreters of the religion (a priest or holy person), a model echoing 
the standard versions of educational authority outlined previously . In the latter, authority 
emanates from the practising subject, with ‘the inner realm of life serving as the source of significance 
and authority’ , wherein the key to ‘right conduct’ lies in participants’ relation to their selves, 
mediated and shaped by their memories and sensations, the internal conversations in which they 
engage and the judgements that they make . Immediately, then, authority here appears more 
scrambled than in the conventional top-down reading, although the risk is of simply reversing the 
polarity to the point where the taught seemingly no longer need a teacher. Indeed, Heelas 
conceptually separates a free subject from external authority, suggesting that participants need to 
experience ‘enough freedom from the conformist authority of established orders to listen to their 
‘inner voice’ or ‘true self’, to live their own lives; ‘to exercise self-responsibility’xxxv, such that the 
freedom of an individual to transform his or her own ‘unique life’  is incompatible with external 
forms of authority. This move is problematic because it leaves little room to develop insight into the 
kinds of ‘external’ authority that undoubtedly play a part in the practice of ‘spiritualities of life’ 
(teachers, gurus, instructional videos or regulatory bodies) . 
 
The only caveat that Heelas makes to his general thesis of ‘self-authority’ is the suggestion that ‘the 
language of the milieu – … ‘support’, ‘opportunity’, ‘possibility’, ‘try this and see for yourself’ – … 
masks what is really taking place: teachers and teachings are exercising their hold. Sharing and caring 
are vehicles for the exercise of power’xxxviii
xxxix
. If this is the case, then more research should be undertaken 
on the exercise of such relationships of power and authority in contexts such as yoga teaching. 
Heelas’s understanding seems to register power only as a vehicle of control and domination, whereas, 
in line with Gallagher’s Foucauldian school geographies, we suggest a more productive account of 
power wherein power is co-produced and not something that simply restricts freedom. This power 
relationship, and hence the work of authority, can thus be explored through its ‘microphysics’: ‘its 
techniques, procedures, levels of applications, targets’; its relational operations variously traced via 
such imaginaries as ‘’capillaries’ ‘transmissions’ and ‘relays’ of power through specific spatial 
fields’ . Borrowing from ‘middle’ and ‘later’ period Foucault, moreover, authority might 
additionally be understood as a way of conducting or stylising others – through knowledges, 
techniques and strategies – but only insofar as those on the receiving end are (or suppose themselves 
to be) free to conduct themselves, and in effect to produce themselves, as subjects of authorityxl. Such 
is the visioning of authority that we stir into Heelas’s take on ‘spiritualities of life’, and inspect 
empirically in the case study that follows. 
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4. Authority, self and other 
 
Foucault’s ‘later’ work
xliii
xli addresses the question of how the individual ‘is led to constitute him or 
herself as subject’xlii. The somewhat unstated importance of the self-disciplining self which sits at the 
heart of ‘panopticism’ – as the individual under the constant threat of surveillance internalises the 
external ‘eye of power’  – now becomes restated, differently cast from what, on one reading, can still 
seem a top-down, conventionally authoritarian account of power in Discipline and Punishxliv. Instead, 
attention alights precisely upon the inner movements of power, as individuals self-discipline 
themselves, not just in fear of reprisals from ‘above’ but as a more fundamental process of self-
constitution wherein questions of knowledge and care (alongside responsibility) become equally if not 
more salient. Now empirically channelled through inquiries into Ancient and Christian practices of 
self-improvement, Foucault focuses upon the ‘experiments’ that individuals conduct upon themselves 
to gain species of self-knowledge – which may be taken as plausible alternatives to the external 
rigours of Classical/Enlightenment ‘science’ or philosophy – holding the potential to radiate out into 
relations with others proximate or distantxlv. Discipline and knowledge, self and others, and related 
relations, such as those of authority and care running between teacher and taught, are duly thrown 
into delicate new alignments and perspectives. 
 
More concretely, Foucault describes how the care of the self might be constructed through particular 
techniques that give ‘form’ to ‘our’ existence and enable the establishment of a ‘well-ordered 
relationship to the world and to others’
xlvii
xlviii
xlvi. This care of the self cannot be practised in isolation because, 
if it is, the relation to the self potentially becomes debased (via ‘egoism, narcissism, hedonism’ ). A 
relationship with another is hence necessary such that we might ‘appeal to someone to help us form 
our opinion of ourselves’ . In contrast to Heelas, for whom subjects must attain freedom from all 
such external authorities so as to live a life true to themselves, here the individual subjects him/herself 
to the educator’s authority so as to be true to him/herself; that is, in order to be ‘free’xlix. Whereas 
Heelas frames the possibility of freedom as an absolute condition, a Foucauldian approach sees 
complex entanglements of power in which freedom is always related in some way to dominationl, 
such that ‘liberty is itself ultimately a discursive effect, a product of a particular power/knowledge 
nexus, rather than some social stateli. The paradox lies in the individual’s understanding that they are 
achieving freedom, whereas they are arguably reinserting themselves into a different form of 
power/knowledge nexus. Foucault further queries what relation to the self is constructed with respect 
to excerising ‘external authority’, because the ‘care of the self, the fashioning of one’s self, and the 
relation to others, what can be broadly termed the ‘government of others’, are firmly linked’lii. What is 
at stake is ‘the establishment of relations of authority over the self and over others such that, if we are an 
expert, the way in which we are an authority over ourselves informs the way we can be an authority 
over others’liii. Those who subject themselves to such relations of authority do so precisely because 
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they can see the success of the project of care of the self in the teacher/expertliv. Foucault thus offers 
what might, with hesitations, be described as a model for understanding the relationship between 
external and internal authority in the constitution of a relation of care of the self, one which thereby 
complicates accounts of authority in the diverse spaces of both education and ‘spiritualities of life’.  
 
The ‘very late’ Foucault’s lectures only interrogate a specific time-space context,
lviii
lv albeit certain more 
general propositions can arise, as just proposed, particularly if run alongside recent writings in so-
called ‘new authority studies’ lvi which emphasise the ‘non-foundational, singular and ephemeral’ 
nature of authority lvii . Writings by Dawney and Noorani , starting to unpack dimensions of 
‘experiential authority’, are particularly pertinent (not least for our own empirics). Dawney seeks to 
understand how the extreme (traumatic) experiences of one individual may become authoritative for 
others. Their testimonies are lent weight by the ‘intensity’ of particular experiences, and the affective 
response of others to such testimonies makes them ‘experts by experience’ lix , which usefully 
elaborates role of the listener in creating such ‘experiential authority’. Noorani’s account is more 
inward-looking, locating authority in the individual’s own experience as he discusses how we might 
engage with the self so that we indeed do become experts in our own (singular) experiences:  
 
… it is in the nature of experience that it teaches truths not accessible through other forms of 
knowledge, such as protocols or textbooks. Indeed, past experiences come to offer promises of 
experiences to come. In these ways, experiential knowledge acquires its own authoritylx. 
 
The individual always hold the potential to be the authority on themselves, for their singular internal 
experience is only (fully) accessible to them. For the purposes here, this means that there may be 
conflicts between the authority of the individual’s singular experience and the more general kind of 
authority of a teacher. While the educator will be the authority in the specific field that they are 
teaching, they will not be able to be the expert of the self that those being educated will likely (be able 
to) claim.  
 
These re-conceptualisations of authority foreshadow a nuanced understanding of how authority 
operates in Ashtanga yoga, one accenting how ‘experiential authority’ acquired by the self (as the 
‘expertise of the self’ about the self) can rest in (and be contradictory to) more widely dispersed forms 
of authority. These external sources of authority are never straightforward reproductions of moral 
systems or external rules, but are always reconstructed via the teacher’s own experiences. Authority in 
the spaces of Ashtanga is always a composite: different sources of authority are folded together in a 
particular aggregation. This composition of authority demands empirical engagement with how the 
kind of voluntary submission to external authorities found in many educational spaces manifests in the 
singular experience of an individual. To effect such an empirical engagement, the paper now 
contextualises the case study and its research methods, before tracing the negotiation of authority 
through the teacher-pupil relationship across three areas of investigation: first, how teachers become 
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‘obeyable’; secondly, the authoritative relation cultivated to the self; and thirdly, the interaction 
between different forms of authority, how these conflict with each other and how these conflicts are 
negotiated.  
 
5. The case study  
 
Ashtanga yoga was established by Sri K. Pattabhi Jois in Mysore, Indialxi. It is said to originate from 
the Yoga Korunta, a text given to Jois by his guru, Sri T. Krishnamacharya. The transnational spread of 
Ashtanga began in the 1970s with Western practitioners, travelling to Mysore and studying at Pattahbi 
Jois’s Ashtanga Yoga Research Institute, returning to their home countries to teach the practice. Before 
his death in 2009, Jois (and other members of his family) travelled annually to the UK, US and other 
parts of the world, while his wider family continues both to teach outside India and to run the school 
in Mysore. A ‘serious engagement with yoga’lxii is particularly predominant in Ashtanga yoga vis-à-vis 
other forms of MPY, and Ashtanga can be distinguished from other forms of MPY by the centrality of 
control and asceticism. Mysore-style classes are also distinctive: unlike in other forms of MPY, where 
teachers demonstrates the poses to pupils who then copy the pose in unison, here pupils work 
through a set sequence of poses at their own pace. The teacher overlooks them and intervenes when 
deeming it appropriate.  
 
The paper draws on a year-long research project into two practices broadly configured as 
‘spiritualities of life’, yoga and mindfulness meditation, carried out in Brighton and Hove (a smallish 
coastal city in the South of England known to possess a high concentration of such practices). A 
qualitative approach involved in-depth interviews with teachers and centre owners, diary-interviews 
conducted with participants in yoga and mindfulness meditation, and observant participation during 
yoga classes and a mindfulness meditation courselxiii. This paper specifically focuses on the data from 
the two participants who practised Ashtanga yoga and also from several Ashtanga teachers (the 
overall dataset was substantially larger). While a limited ‘sample’ here, the volume of data was 
detailed: five day-long space-time diaries and in-depth interviews. The diarists became ‘proxy 
ethnographic researchers’ on our behalf, becoming ‘observant of their own (embodied) participation ‘in 
the field’ of new spiritualities’lxiv. Diarists were asked to provide some details about their background 
(their history of engagement with spiritual practices and other personal circumstances) and the diary 
format required that they recorded their activities, noting their time-location and reflecting on their 
yoga practices (how they fitted within their day, how they experienced it). These diaries shaped the 
subsequent interviews, which consisted of follow-up questions about the individual’s practices and 
their insertion in the ‘warp and weft of how they inhabited the city and its constituent places 
(neighbourhoods, parks, seafronts, shops, cafés, health centres, yoga studios, meditation centres, and 
so on)’ lxv. While the paper here cannot claim to be an ‘authoritative’ analysis of Ashtanga yoga, it 
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prompts questions that might be valuably asked of both other forms/spaces of education and 
‘spiritualities of life’. 
 
6. The practice of authority in Ashtanga yoga 
 
a) Experiential authority  
 
The diarists’ supposed that the authority of the practice – a sense of their own practice as a source of 
‘experiential authority’ – was demonstrated and achieved on a daily basis, ingrained in the feel of 
their own bodies and minds during the practice, in the afterglow and then in the familiar repetition 
and habit of daily practice. Diarist 1lxvi articulated a strong sense of such interior authority during her 
interview, saying: 
 
“... once I tried it I realised that it was actually a really, really good thing and it was something 
I really, really enjoyed and I just made the time and money for it”lxvii. 
 
“I feel really healthy, I feel really strong, I feel like my immune system is much better than it 
used to be … my digestion system used to be quite bad and that’s it’s been so much better 
since I started practising. I sleep better, my hair and nails grow quicker … and on a spiritual 
level … it’s kind of like a ritual and … it feels like a devotional practice as well, so there’s 
definitely a spiritual element in there as well and it’s quite meditative and I feel like … I’m 
getting to know myself better through having this practice”. 
 
At the same time, her experiences of missing the practice reinforced this value of her daily Ashtanga 
practice:  
 
“I can really tell the difference on the days I don’t practise, i.e. more tired, sluggish, less 
energy, and it makes me thankful and more appreciative that I do have a regular practice to 
sustain me and give me that energy boost in the morning. So it’s a good reminder” (diarist 1, 
diary). 
 
Being reliant on self-practice, the realm of inner experience was crucial in cultivating the authority of 
the self for the participants. The students became attuned to the practice and learned to judge 
themselves in relation to it, as diarist 1 suggested in her diary: “I feel like I’m practising with an injury 
at the moment, which is a good lesson as it’s forcing me to be gentle and go steady”. Thus, the 
participants are likely to develop exactly the kind of expertise in engaging with their own experience 
as outlined by Noorani.  
 
Even though the predominant source of authority during Mysore classes was the self – “yoga’s like 
more direct internal, an hour and a half, on your own, on your mat” (diarist 3lxviii, interview) – the 
teacher being physically in the room was also seen to provide a helpful regulatory presence – “the 
teacher keeps you there when you want to run” (diarist 3, interview). This comment suggests that 
experiential authority, constituted internally within the self, was always related to external forms of 
authority, troubling Heelas’s suggestion that the inner realm is the sole source of authority in 
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‘spiritualities of life’. 
 
b) External authorities 
 
While Heelas plays down external sources of authority, Ashtanga yoga has a tradition of strong 
external authority. The students participating in this research perhaps have an even more pronounced 
relationship to external authority than do other Ashtanga students because they practised every day 
with a teacher. One of the interview questions asked participants what they looked for in a teacher, 
and in response diarist 3 discussed the teacher’s embodiment of expertise:  
 
“... someone who’s walked the road and they’re further down the road than you and that then 
inspires you to keep walking down the same road because they must … have some attractive 
quality that you … admire or respect or both”. 
 
He also saw his teacher embodying positive qualities, such as stillness and quietness, bestowed by 
serious practice of Ashtanga yoga: 
 
“Despite the kind of intensity of the practice, [the teacher] seemed very quiet and still … there 
was a similarity I think between him and [my first teacher] and I think I’m clearly attracted … 
to that … you think, ‘this guy seems really peaceful’. And yet, with Ashtanga, there’s like a 
fierceness to the practice and an energy to it, and yet there’s a softness as well and … I was 
really struck by the sort of seeming paradox of … really hard work, and yet … there is this 
stillness underneath” (diarist 3, interview). 
 
The structure of Ashtanga yoga formalises expertise, being based around a particular gurusisya 
(‘teacher-discipline’) relationship’lxix. In order to become an authorised Ashtanga teacher, the teacher 
must have learned from the founder of Ashtanga yoga, the late Pattahbi Jois, or one of his family or 
another authorised teacher – the authority of the practice being transmitted via this lineage. Diarist 1 
knew the significance of this lineage, considering the “late Shri K Pattahbi Jois to be [her] guru”, 
thereby underscoring a form of distant or removed expertise that lasted even beyond death. This guru 
status is made possible by the ‘systematisation, transmission, and ordered application of 
knowledge’lxx in the name of Ashtanga. One of the teachers who worked in a natural health centre 
drew on this lineage, saying that “the Ashtanga yoga that we do is very pure to the roots from Mysore 
in India”, thus distinguishing it from “a gym style of Ashtanga which is very different” (teacher 2, 
interview).  
 
The lineage was also respected by diarist 1, who described when her usual teacher was replaced by a 
teacher who had: 
 
“... lived in Mysore … for about ten years …[so] … knew the Jois family, knew Guruji [Jois, the 
guru/spiritual leader] and he was taught directly by him. And he was very kind of … , ‘this is 
what Guruji says so this is how you must do it’ … I respect him for following that path … 
without question because that gave him a certain sense … authority … And actually I think I 
really respected that teacher because, even though a lot of people would disagree with what 
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they were saying and were like, you know, ‘what if I don’t want to do it your way?’, it was 
kind of like, well then, ... ‘go to another teacher’” (diarist 1, interview). 
 
This remark points to diverse relations held by students to the Ashtanga lineage, also raising the 
potential for conflicts with strict adherence to the Ashtanga way of working. Diarist 1 noted that: 
 
“He was just kind of helicoptered in ... and he had a sense of authority before he even arrived 
because he’s an authorised teacher … He came in and it was just like turned everything 
upside down. It was just like this kind of like whirlwind and a lot of people reacted very 
strongly to it”. 
 
While Heelas suggests that external forms of authority might be limiting, restricting the freedom of 
participants in ‘spiritualities of life’, the interviewees saw the external authority of the teachers as 
predominantly beneficial, setting an example anchored in the intensity of their own prior experiences 
and resultant learning. 
 
Moreover, the Mysore spatial layout of the class, whereby the teacher moves round, observing the 
students as they practice from all angles, allows the teacher to develop an in-depth knowledge of the 
student and their embodiment of Ashtanga. The teacher enacts authoritative relations with the 
students in two main ways. First, they offer verbal instructions and make physical adjustments to the 
poses that the student is doing. During adjustments, the teacher uses hand-on-body contact to move 
different parts of the student’s body into the ‘correct’ pose, giving the student a feel for the pose and 
“giv[ing] people ... a chance to feel that they can perhaps do it one day on their own” (teacher 1, 
interview). Secondly, the teacher regulates the student’s progress through the sequence of poses, 
arbitrating when they are ready to move onto the next pose. According to Heelas’s framework, this 
intervention might be experienced as a deadening of the participant’s freedom, but diarist 1 offered a 
counter interpretation, suggesting that it facilitated her practice:  
 
“I think it’s good to have that every now … to be pushed ... and especially with something 
like Ashtanga, where you are progressing through a series, and it’s ... like you could just stay 
where you are for years and, unless someone is actually pushing you and helping you 
progress, it would be easy to just kind of get a bit stale and a bit stuck and so, yeah, and so I 
think that is important”. 
 
Both student and teacher correspond in believing the importance of the student submitting to this 
version of external authority, so they might access the kinds of truths that they see to be held in the 
practice of Ashtanga. The teacher is seen to have a better knowledge than the students themselves of 
what they might be able to achieve, and the teacher’s external view enables the student to access 
possibilities in their practice not previously contemplated. Diarist 3 noted that the teacher “can see 
things in your body and your practice that you can’t see because you’re too close to it”, suggesting 
that the authority of one’s own experience might sometimes be experienced as limiting, with the 
expert gaze of the teacher being vital in overriding this self-limiting experiential authority. This point 
echoes Foucault’slxxi assertion that we require an educative relationship with the other, so that we can 
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overcome the potential solipsism of our relation to ourselves. 
 
The institution and practice of Ashtanga yoga itself was also seen by the interviewees to embody 
expertise. The practice, as laid out by Guruji, was trusted to be complete, offering everything needed 
by the students:  
 
“the consistent practice and the structure of the practice means that you don’t hide in the 
things that you’re good at and you can’t avoid the things that you’re not good at” (diarist 3, 
interview). 
 
The structure was reckoned to assist students in becoming better yogis as they could gain balance and 
not submit to their own whims about what they liked and did not like to dolxxii: 
 
“... one of the major things that attracted me to Ashtanga was that it was a daily practice 
which gave me a structure ... that I could surrender to … we do the same poses every day, the 
postures are the same, the time that you practice is the same” (diarist 3, interview). 
 
The repetitive, regularised structure of Ashtanga was also found to be comforting, offering a familiar 
continuity as bodies and minds became attuned to the rhythms of the practice. Even so, the interviews 
and diaries show that there was not always this kind of easy correspondence between external 
authorities and students’ own experiential authority, as we now turn to discuss.  
 
c) Relating external and internal authority 
 
One instance from diarist 3’s interview and diary is especially instructive for questions about how 
individuals negotiate conflicting forms of authority, specifically how they might draw together 
various and multiple sources of influence and authority in ways potentially changing shape over time 
and space. He describes in detail his struggle to ‘drop-back’ – essentially moving from a standing 
posture to a wheel posture in which the feet and hands are on the floor, with the chest and front of the 
legs facing outwards and upwards, forming an inverted U-shape (Urdhva Dhanurasana). In his diary, 
he described how he was: 
 
“Really struggling with the back-drops against the wall… I feel so frustrated. Partly because I 
feel that I should be able to do this and also [my teacher] telling me that I should be able to do 
it and I’m not doing it!”. 
 
This entry suggested a consensus with the teacher’s belief, based on close observation of the diarist-
student, that he should be able to drop-back. The diarist trusted in the external view of himself that the 
teacher offered, but this trust was partly constructed via his own experiential authority and the 
assessment of his own capacities to which it gave rise. He addressed this matter further in a later diary 
entry: 
 
“I’ve been really focussed on dropping back for quite a while now, and all of the teachers I’ve 
worked with recently have said that I should be able to do it. The obstacle is my mind! When I 
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try and do it, my fear just stops me and I panic … I’ve had teachers telling me I should be able 
to do this for 7 months now, so it’s a cause of some frustration within myself that I’ve not tried 
it on my own. The fear just seems like insurmountable”. 
 
The conflict located here is not between the teacher and taught, but rather within the participant 
himself, who diagnosed a conflict between the potential ability of his body and his emotional response 
to this potential. Even his self-authority and will to drop-back was seemingly insufficient to overcome 
the ‘experiential authority’ of this ‘insurmountable’ fear, which he took as the barrier to him dropping 
back. It is hence not always possible to exert self-authority straightforwardly: simply to will 
something and for it then to happen. He added: 
 
“I realised for the first time today that no-one can help me with this. I actually have to 
physically tip myself backwards and land on my hands. It doesn’t feel very ‘yogic’ to 
physically force myself to do something … But today was an important milestone in my 
thinking. This is something I choose to do and only I can actually make it happen. So 
somehow I have to find a way through the fear”. 
 
His authority was nested within the teacher’s authority; he accepted the teacher’s assessment that he 
should be able to do the drop-backs, and he recognised the need to exert authority over himself, 
forcing himself to drop-back in order to achieve the pose. Such achievement is another step towards 
the ‘enlightenment’ offered by Ashtanga yoga, but the external authority of the teacher just telling him 
to drop-back was not enough. The diarist referenced the tensions present in negotiating these different 
sources (and times and spaces) of authority, noting that ‘it’s a fine line between … self discipline, 
devotion and dedication and kind of just being really tough on yourself’ (diarist 3, interview). 
 
This diarist also hinted at wider conflicts between different forms of self-authority, suggesting that the 
most important thing is to exert the will over oneself in order to do the daily practice, rather than 
exerting the will over oneself in order to progress through the sequence of poses: 
  
“... it’s the process, the discipline, it’s the daily discipline of self-practice that is more 
important than achieving any one pose … I know that intellectually, but emotionally the two 
don’t add up. So emotionally I’m all like bent out of shape because, ‘Oh my God’, my teacher 
says I can do it; my teacher’s teacher says I can do it; the guy from the other side of the world 
says I can do it. You know, everyone says I can do it and yet I’m failing to do the thing that all 
of these people say that I should be able to do” (diarist 3, interview). 
 
What is still overriding for this participant are the teacher’s expectations and his own overriding sense 
that he should be able to drop-back, which prevail over both his feeling of fear (or his experiential 
authority) and also his understanding of the wider ethos of yoga. In a passage quoted earlier, the 
diarist had reflected that this kind of self-mastery and forcing himself does not feel very ‘yogic’, thus 
crystallising a further conflict between (his understanding of) the wider yogic ethos of ‘non-striving’ 
and the more localised authority of the teacher meeting the authority of his own experience. This 
material demonstrates an intricate, complex negotiation between different forms of authority which 
all Ashtanga participants have to face, if rarely quite so reflexively or knowingly. By the time that the 
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interview was conducted with this diarist, he had managed to drop-back and again he emphasised the 
significance of the teacher’s authority:  
 
“I didn’t believe I could drop-back and I needed people to tell me that I could do this. If they 
hadn’t told me I probably never would have done it” (diarist 3, interview). 
 
Here he confirmed the truth of the teacher’s authority, but also the wider structures of Ashtanga yoga 
within which that authority is located. He addressed the significance of his own experiential authority, 
as well as his own body’s agency in resisting the kinds of self-discipline that he usually wants to exert. 
The application here of the self on the self is a potentially problematic process, as the self is not 
necessarily malleable and compliant, and the possibility of failing to become an expert of the self, and 
the consequences of this failure, are interesting future questions to ask.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
‘Regardless of the expense, let’s seek out new teachers.’lxxiii  
 
Towards the close of his very last lecture course, Foucault urged the value of teachers, not necessarily 
because of special authority lodged in the figure of any one individual teacher, but because of the 
external authority residing in the logos which the (good) teacher will teach. It is a Socratic move, 
passing beyond ‘a teacher of tekne who can pass on his teaching to students’lxxiv
lxxvi, externally anchored and derived. ‘Foucault was insistent on showing that this care [this 
learning] was lxxvii, but a social practice
lxxviii
 – as in the educator 
who goes through the motions of transmitting ‘technical’, repeated, rote knowledge – towards the 
model of a teacher who communicates the logos (‘the missing teacher’) as arguably deeper truths about 
the care of the self. Such a teacher ‘will have to take care of himself [sic] by listening to the language of 
mastery (maîtrise) that comes from the logos itself’ lxxv. In short, both teacher and taught are here 
positioned in relation to the external authority of a broader accumulated, guiding wisdom, and as 
such we vacate the more conventional (top-down) picturing of authority’s educational geographies (as 
in section 2 above). Yet, we perhaps shift even further from Heelas’s self-absorbed account of 
authority, with its individualistic (bottom-up) picturing of authority’s new-spiritual geographies (as in 
section 3 above). The key relation – of how educators educate, or how maybe they ought best to 
educate – becomes more firmly about a negotiated stance with respect to an overall ‘armature for 
life’
 not a solitary exercise’, writes Gros  and even an invitation to 
good government (correctly caring for the self in order to care correctly for others)’.  
 
A productive reading of authority enables us to counter Heelas’s assertion that the influence of 
external authorities is (always) limiting, and the accounts offered by our interviewees emphasise the 
multiple and shifting relations that they possess to the external authorities significant in their 
Ashtanga practice. For our participants, taking part in Ashtanga is not about becoming free from 
external sources of authority, such as teachers, but is rather about a complex interplay between 
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different (sometimes competing) forms of authority which students have to negotiate and (try to) 
reconcile during their practice. Further studies of Ashtanga yoga, other forms of MPY and wider 
practices that are understood as ‘spiritualities of life’ are required, in order to trace more of the ways 
in which we (the educated) become ‘enlisted into our own self-fashioning’lxxix and the forms of human 
subjectivity then emergent. 
 
We have also sought to intimate alternative geographies of authority as they might arise in 
educational settings, including ones of yogic ‘training’. Indeed, we have conjured some new themes 
for geographical inquiry (and for related fields) by pinpointing authority as worthy of scrutiny in its 
own right, not merely as a dimension of power, and in the process asking critical questions about how 
authority is enacted, recognised, believed and obeyed – or not – in educational and closely related 
settings. Concretely, we have offered a case study of negotiating authority in the teaching and 
learning of Ashtanga yoga which underlines one more space
lxxxi
lxxx – the Mysore-style yoga studio – 
which can be seen as implicated in ‘the persuading of people (or, rather, in people persuading 
themselves) to take seriously ‘the relationship that one ought to have with one’s status, one’s functions, 
one’s activities, and one’s obligations’ . Ashtanga yoga relies on an arguably stronger sense of 
external authority than has traditionally been understood to exist in ‘spiritualities of life’, although 
this external authority does not, by any means, replace the authority of the subjective experiences of 
the participant. Instead, there is a complex interplay between the teacher and student, who together 
negotiate the authority of what comprises the ‘right’ conduct on an ongoing basis. As such, the 
examples illuminate the range of different authority relations that exist between teachers and pupils in 
‘spiritualities of life’, even troubling the definition that Heelas gives of the very category of 
‘spiritualities of life’, based as it is on the location of authority within and not outside of the self.  
 
At the same time, the case study reminds geographers of education that a complexity and range of 
different (power) relations exist in schools and other educational settings. The space of the yoga class, 
which lies far outside of more conventional educational spaces such as schools, alerts geographers of 
education to the push of recognising and attending to the multiple (and multiplying) ‘alternative’ 
spaces in which education happenslxxxii. Attending to different educational spaces might underline 
commonalities and differences regarding
lxxxiii
lxxxiv
lxxxv
 what enters into ‘distributed authority’, as well as 
illuminating how those being educated are developing (or resisting) the kinds of self-authority often 
demanded in current educational contexts . Moreover, if obliquely, we are echoing the later 
Foucault in considering how work on alternative geographies of authority – in various spheres of 
operation – might conceive of how ‘[a] different relationship must be established [between teacher 
and taught], a relationship of care, assistance and help’ ; one where ‘[t]he same founding act of 
taking possession of self by self [self-authority] gives me enjoyment of myself, ... and enables me to be 
useful to others in their trouble and misfortune’ . 
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